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MASS TORT CLAIMS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
PROCEEDINGS: WHAT ARE THE LESSONS FROM THE 
ECUADOR-CHEVRON DISPUTE? 
CHIARA GIORGETTI* 
In parallel to the Lago Agrio and Aguinda litigations in the U.S. 
and Ecuadorian proceedings that have been discussed already,1 the 
Chevron dispute includes an international dimension that presents 
equally complex and important challenges, but focuses on very 
different issues and involves different parties. 
My remarks introduce these international proceedings first to 
explain the different actions taken by the parties in different 
forums. I then assess the viability of international dispute 
resolution mechanisms for mass tort claims in general, before 
considering more specifically whether they can provide sufficient 
redress to mass tort claimants. Finally, I briefly introduce 
alternative dispute resolution forums to assess their applicability in 
mass tort claims. 
1. INTRODUCTION: THE CHEVRON/ECUADOR DISPUTE 
In order to understand the Chevron/Ecuador dispute, it is 
important to contextualize the case historically—especially to 
understand Ecuador’s position and how its relation to 
Texaco/Chevron plays out on the international plane. 
Ecuador’s first concession to Texaco Petroleum (“Tex-Pet”) and 
the Gulf Oil Company (“Gulf”) to explore Ecuador’s Oriente region 
was granted to both companies, as a consortium, in 1964.2  In 1973, 
                                                     
* Assistant Professor of Law, Richmond University School of Law, LLM, JSD 
(Yale).  These remarks are adapted from a presentation given at the University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law Symposium.  I would like to thank the 
organizers for their invitation and for organizing a thought-provoking 
symposium. 
1 Reference to prior Remarks at the University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Law Symposium: Mass Torts in a Shrinking World (Nov. 2, 2012). 
2 This overview is based on the chronology prepared by the Arbitration 
Tribunal.  See Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Chevron 
Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, No. 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Feb. 27, 2012), available 
at http://italaw.com/cases/257. 
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Tex-Pet, Gulf, and Ecuador entered into another concession 
agreement, with terms expiring in 1992.3  In 1974, PetroEcuador—a 
state-owned enterprise—acquired 25% of the concession.4  Between 
1976 and 1992, PetroEcuador’s stake grew to 62.5%, while Tex-Pet 
maintained a 37.5% share.5  The operator of the concession was 
Tex-Pet and the profits were split.6 
In 1990, Petroamazonas—an entity expressly created as 
PetroEcuador’s subsidiary—became the operator of the 
consortium.7  Prior to handing over the Consortium concession, an 
environmental audit was performed which identified several areas 
that needed environmental remediation, for an estimated cost of 
approximately eight to thirteen million dollars.8 
In 1992, the Consortium concession ended and Tex-Pet 
transferred its interests in the consortium to PetroEcuador.9 
In 1995, Tex-Pet and Ecuador signed a settlement agreement, in 
which Tex-Pet agreed to undertake environmental remedial work 
in exchange for being released and discharged from all of its legal 
and contractual obligations, and from any liability for the 
consortium’s impact on the environment. 10   In 1996, Tex-Pet 
obtained a municipal and provincial release.11  Finally, in 1998, 
Ecuador issued the final release certifying that Tex-Pet performed 
all of its obligations under the 1995 Settlement Agreement, thus 
releasing Tex-Pet from any and all environmental liability arising 
out of the Consortium’s operations. 12  The dispute between 
Texaco/Chevron and Ecuador arose in this context.  
From an international investment law prospective, therefore, 
the international litigation relating to the Lago Agrio dispute is very 
different from the domestic litigations dismissed in the United 
                                                     
3 Id. pt. 3, § 3.6, at 2.  
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. pt. 3, § 3.7, at 2. Claimants write in their brief that “throughout the 
existence of the Consortium, approximately 90% of the revenues generated 
(approximately $25 billion) went directly to Ecuador in the form of revenues, 
royalties, taxes and subsidies.”  Claimants’ Notice of Arbitration ¶ 9, Chevron v. 
Republic of Ecuador, No. 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Sept. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.chevron.com/Documents/Pdf/Ecuadorbiten.Pdf. 
7 See Third Interim Award, supra note 2.  
8 Id.  
9 Id. pt. 3, § 3.11, at 3-4. 
10 Id. pt. 3, § 3.17, at 5. 
11 Id. pt. 3, § 3.23, at 6-7. 
12 Id. pt. 3, § 3.26, at 7. 
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States on forum non conveniens grounds, and from those 
proceedings currently underway in Ecuador.  The government of 
Ecuador, who is not party to any domestic proceedings, played an 
important role in the negotiation, operation, and termination of the 
concession, and the assessment of that role is fundamental in the 
international litigation. 
Indeed, the current international proceedings function in an 
entirely different manner in terms of parties, litigants, and issues 
litigated.  International law remains state-centered, and it points to 
Ecuador as the main subject of the international arbitration 
proceedings.  Additionally, the international investment arbitration 
places Chevron/Texaco in opposition to Ecuador and does not 
directly involve the plaintiffs in related domestic proceedings. 
2. REDRESS FROM INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PROCEEDINGS: THE 
CHEVRON/TEXACO – ECUADOR EXAMPLE  
In 2009, Chevron (which acquired Texaco in 2001) and Texaco 
initiated proceedings against Ecuador, in accordance with the 1993 
Ecuador-U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) which entered 
into force in 1997, and the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration at 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague.13 
Essentially, Claimants initiated proceedings in 2009 to prevent 
liability and enforceability of any judgments rendered against 
Chevron in the Lago Agrio litigation, including an award of 
indemnification in favor of the Claimants against Ecuador for the 
sum of money awarded in the Lago Agrio judgment.14 
In the proceedings, Chevron and Texaco argued that Ecuador 
failed to provide them with an effective means of asserting claims 
                                                     
13 Essential background information is available on the PCA website at: 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1408.  Note that there are two 
arbitrations pending at the PCA between Chevron/Texaco and Ecuador.  The first 
suit was filed in 2007, relates to issues of denial of justice, and in 2011 resulted in a 
final award of $96 million in favor of Chevron.  The second, which is discussed in 
this presentation, was filed in 2009 and is still pending.  International investment 
arbitration is a dispute resolution system that provides a neutral venue to resolve 
disputes between a foreign investor and the host state of the investment related to 
the conduct and operation of foreign investments.  For an introduction to 
international investment arbitration, see Carolyn Lamm, Chiara Giorgetti, & 
Mairée Uran-Bidegain, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes in 
THE RULES, PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 77 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2012) [hereinafter THE RULES, PRACTICE, AND 
JURISPRUDENCE]; Brooks Daly, Permanent Court of Arbitration, in THE RULES, 
PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE, at 37. 
14 Third Interim Award, supra note 2, pt. 1, § 1.28, at 8-10. 
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and enforcing rights.  They also argued that they were denied fair 
and equitable treatment, full protection and security, and national 
treatment—obligations required of Ecuador in its application of the 
BIT. 15   Further, after the Ecuadorian court in the province of 
Succombìos issued a decision awarding the Lago Agrio plaintiffs 
nineteen billion dollars in February 2011, Claimants added a claim 
that the judgment was a denial of justice, which was brought about 
by fraud and corruption, and alleged that Ecuador was in collusion 
with the plaintiffs in Lago Agrio.16 
The Tribunal, sitting in The Hague, has issued four interim 
awards and decided it had jurisdiction to proceed to the merits.17  
During the pendency of the arbitration, the Tribunal ordered 
Ecuador to take “all measures necessary to suspend” the 
enforcement and recognition, within and without Ecuador, of the 
judgment by the Succombìos provincial courts.18  The Tribunal also 
ordered Claimants to deposit fifty million U.S. dollars with the 
Secretariat of the PCA as security for any contingent responsibility 
towards Ecuador.19  In the Fourth Interim Award, the Tribunal 
found that Ecuador had failed to comply with the Tribunal’s order. 
 The merits of the case are still pending, and the Tribunal is 
following two-track parallel proceedings in which it will first 
decide on the validity and scope of the release.20  Should Claimants 
win on the merits, the Tribunal may require Ecuador to indemnify 
the Claimants for any sums of money awarded in the Lago Agrio 
judgment.  
 The international arbitration, therefore, will only have indirect 
effects in the context of the mass claims for environmental 
damages arising out of the oil exploitation agreements.  The Lago 
Agrio plaintiffs are not part of the litigation.  The case at issue in the 
                                                     
15 Id.  
16 Lucinda A. Low, Remarks, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 106TH ANNUAL MEETING 
OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONFRONTING COMPLEXITY 420 
(Harlan Cohen, Chiara Giorgetti, & Cymie Payne eds., 2013) (noting that Chevron 
and Texaco’s additional claim essentially asserts Ecuador’s collusion with the Lago 
Agrio plaintiffs to hold Chevron/Texaco solely responsible for environmental 
damage to the exclusion of the state and PetroEcuador). 
17 Since the date of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Law Symposium, a fourth interim award has been issued.  See supra note 2. 
18 Chevron v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, supra note 16, pt. 7, § 75, at 26. 
19 Id. pt. 7, § 75, at 26-27. 
20 Procedural Order No. 10, ¶ 1-3, Chevron v. Ecuador, No. 2009-23 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. Apr. 9, 2012), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/ 
case-documents/ita0913.pdf. 
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international arbitration is separate and—regardless of what 
happens—it cannot bring direct redress to the Lago Agrio plaintiffs. 
Indeed, international investment arbitration deals with investment 
disputes and it positions an investor against the State in which the 
investment is made. It is not generally the best tool to address 
complex, inter-systemic, and international torts disputes. 
3. REDRESS FROM INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PROCEEDINGS? THE 
ABACLAT V. ARGENTINA EXAMPLE 
A recent, groundbreaking, decision in Abaclat v. Argentina, 
however, demonstrates the flexibility and innovative potential of 
international investment arbitration, and sets an important 
precedent for mass claims proceedings in international 
arbitration.21 
 The case was brought by 60,000 Italian investors against 
Argentina, after Argentina defaulted on its sovereign debt, and the 
sovereign bonds it had issued to these investors lost most of their 
value. 22   Claimants had rejected a non-negotiable settlement 
proposal, and brought a case against Argentina at ICSID alleging 
violation of the Italy-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty.23  
The case is still pending on the merits.  However, the Tribunal’s 
decision accepting jurisdiction already confirmed - for the first time 
- that mass claims could be heard by an international investment 
tribunal.24  The Abaclat Tribunal showed its willingness to consider 
cases that are not typical (but could become more prevalent), and 
cases that offer redress to multiple claimants that are small 
investors and lacked other forms of redress in international 
proceedings.  The Tribunals’ novel approach could open the door 
to other similar litigation, for example litigation related to the 
defaults in Greece and other European countries.25 
Thus, though international investment tribunals do not 
typically and immediately hear mass claims, they may still be able 
to prospectively hear certain kinds of mass claims. 
                                                     
21 See generally, Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011), available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0236.pdf. 
22 Id.  
23 Id. at 41.  
24 Id. at 109-201.   
25 Global Arbitration Review reports that Cypriots and Slovak investors have 
filed the first ICSID claim against Greece arising from its 2012 restructuring of 
sovereign debt.  See GAR, 7 May, 2013. 
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4. PROCEEDINGS AT THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
A second international forum has played a role in the Lago 
Agrio-Aguinda dispute.  In response to the Chevron-Ecuador 
international Arbitral Tribunal’s order on interim measures, the 
Lago Agrio plaintiffs filed a request for preliminary measures with 
the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (the 
Commission or the Inter-American Commission) against 
Ecuador.26 
The Aguinda plaintiffs alleged that their right to be 
compensated for environmental damage would be violated if the 
Claimants obtained the relief they sought in the international 
arbitration and the Ecuadorian judgment in their favor was not 
enforced.27  The plaintiffs thus requested that the Inter-American 
Commission indicate provisional measures to ensure that the 
Ecuadorian government would not interfere with the enforcement 
of the judgment by the Ecuadorian provincial courts.28 
Generally, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission can 
hear cases alleging enumerated human rights violations, if those 
cases are brought by nationals of a signatory state of the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights and if the cases are 
brought against the signatory state. 29   Under Article 25 of the 
Commission’s Rules of Procedure, the Commission can grant 
                                                     
26 Ted Folkman, Breaking: Lago Agrio Plaintiffs Sue Ecuador in the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, LETTERS BLOGATORY (Feb. 9, 2012), 
http://lettersblogatory.com/2012/02/09/chevron-ecuador-oas/. The blog post 
also includes a link to the Petition. 
27 Id. 
28 Specifically, plaintiffs requested measures sufficient to ensure that “1. the 
Republic of Ecuador will refrain from taking any action that would contravene, 
undermine, or threaten the human rights of the Afectados to life, physical 
integrity, and health, or their rights to a fair trial in all respects, to judicial 
protection, to the determination of remedies for their claims and the enforcement 
of any remedies so determined, and to equal protection of the law without 
discrimination” and “2. the Republic of Ecuador take all appropriate measures to 
affirmatively protect the Afectados’ right to life, physical integrity, health, a fair 
trial, judicial protection, the determination and enforcement of remedies for 
claims, and equal protection of the law without discrimination.”  Id. 
29 For an overview of the Commission and of the Inter-American Courts on 
Human Rights, see Christina M. Cerna, The Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in THE RULES, PRACTICE, AND 
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 13, at 365. 
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precautionary measures on a showing of imminent threat and 
irreparable harm.30  
The Aguinda petitioners, however, withdrew their claims before 
it could be heard by the Commission and after the Commission 
asked for evidence of harm to health and life.31  The reasons that 
precipitated the withdrawal are not clear, though there is 
speculation that plaintiffs were reluctant to antagonize Ecuador at 
this particular juncture of the international arbitration.32 
The petition raises interesting questions about the jurisdiction 
of the Commission and regarding the interaction between 
international investment arbitral awards and the international 
human rights protection system. 
Petitioning the Commission can result in a more immediate 
remedy for alleged mass torts than the remedies available in 
international investment arbitration.  The Commission can give 
reparations (although the amounts it usually awards are dwarfed 
by the nineteen billion dollars in damages awarded by the 
Succombìos provincial court).  Further, the Commission has already 
decided positively on issues relating to indigenous peoples.  In 
Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, for example, it recognized the communal 
property rights of indigenous inhabitants and called upon 
Nicaragua to delimit, demarcate, and title the lands to the whole 
community.33    When seized on the matter, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights approved preliminary measures to defend 
                                                     
30 Id. 
31 Low, supra note 16, at 421. 
32 Charles N. Brower & Diane Brown, From Pinochet in The House of Lords to 
the Chevron/Ecuador Lago Agrio Dispute: The Hottest Topics in International Dispute 
Resolution, 26 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 31-32 (2013). 
33 Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 
(Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/ 
seriec_79_esp.pdf.  For an overview of the case, see Claudio Grossman, Awas 
Tingni v. Nicaragua: A Landmark Case for the Inter-American System, 8 HUM. RTS. 
BRIEF 2, 2 (2001), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/08/3 
grossman.pdf (“In 1996, the Republic of Nicaragua issued a Korean corporation 
permission to cut trees in the communal lands of the Mayagna indigenous 
community, the Awas Tingni.  This community unsuccessfully tried to prevent 
the Government of Nicaragua from proceeding further in this endeavor.  
Community members attempted to solve the problem first by negotiating with the 
government, and then by resorting to the national judiciary.  Finally, the case was 
brought to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission), and 
then before the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (Inter-American Court).  
This case marks the first time the Inter-American Court has been called upon to 
address the property rights afforded to indigenous populations in the 
Americas.”). 
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the private property of the indigenous people and awarded 
compensation.34 
In this case, however, plaintiffs renounced to full litigation, 
which, in any event, would have only provided limited monetary 
compensation. 
5. WHAT ARE THE LESSONS FROM OTHER  INTERNATIONAL 
ADJUDICATIVE MECHANISMS? 
 This brief analysis demonstrates that neither international 
investment arbitration nor the Inter-American Human Rights 
system can provide full redress in mass tort claims.  Indeed, while 
each has advantages and disadvantages and can provide limited 
redress and compensation when certain characteristics exist, at 
present, there are no international forums that have general 
jurisdiction over mass tort claims.   
 It is therefore useful to briefly examine, in closing, alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms that could serve as a useful 
blueprint in the development of a specific forum for mass tort 
claims.  The paragraphs below very briefly examine four examples. 
The first two examples, the United Nations Compensation 
Commission and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal are examples of ad 
hoc mechanisms created to hear mass claims between sovereigns.  
The following two examples, the Claims Resolution Process and 
the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, are examples 
of private forums created to hear mass claims. 
1. The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) 
was created by the UN Security Council to provide compensation 
for claims arising out of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990-
91. 35   The UNCC worked for several years, issued millions in 
compensation, and made important findings on environmental 
damages caused by oil pollution—a possible subject for mass 
claims.36  From 1991 to 2005, UNCC received and examined more 
                                                     
34 Grossman, supra note 33, at 3 (noting the Commission’s requests that the 
Court require Nicaragua to “demarcate the territorial boundaries of its indigenous 
populations and to abstain from granting licenses allowing the use of removal of 
natural resources . . . until the precise demarcation has taken place” and to 
“provide compensation, both material and moral, for the suffering the community 
experienced . . . and pay the legal expenses incurred by the Awas Tingni”). 
35 See Introduction, THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, www. 
uncc.ch/introduc.htm (last updated July 29, 2008). See also Timothy J. Feighery, 
The United Nations Compensation Commission, in THE RULES, PRACTICE, AND 
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 13, at 515. 
36  Id.  
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than 2.6 million claims seeking a total of approximately $352 billion 
dollars in compensation.37   For example, the UNCC Governing 
Council approved the payment of more than $3.2 billion in 
compensation for over 860,000 successful small claims brought by 
individuals that had to leave Iraq or Kuwait because of the 
conflict.38   The UNCC proved to be an effective mechanism to 
identify and review small claims, and it is, therefore, a good 
template for mass torts remedy.  However, UNCC was a unique 
body that was created ad hoc and was—unwillingly—financed by 
Iraq. 39   Its ‘duplicability’ for other similar causes is therefore 
doubtful. 
2. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear small 
claims that are brought by U.S. or Iranian claimants against Iran or 
the United States respectively.40  The Iran-U.S. Tribunal is also an 
ad hoc institution created by the will of the United States and Iran 
to resolve disputes in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution and 
the Iranian Hostage Crisis. 41   This Tribunal was similarly 
established by the agreement of those parties involved and its 
ability to be replicated is doubtful.   
3. The Claims Resolution Process (CRP) provided the first 
opportunity for Holocaust victims, and their heirs, to have an 
independent body resolve their claims to assets that were 
deposited in Swiss banks.42  Swiss banks provided $1.25 billion to 
                                                     
37 See The Claims, THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, 
http://www.uncc.ch/theclaims.htm (last updated July 29, 2008).  
38 See Category “A” Claims, THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, 
http://www.uncc.ch/claims/a_claims.htm (last updated July 29, 2008). 
39 See id.  
40 Declaration of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the United 
States & Islamic Republic of Iran, art. II (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 1981), available at 
http://www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/1-General%20Declaration%E2% 
80%8E.pdf.  See, generally, Jeremy K. Sharpe, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, in 
THE RULES, PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra  note 13, at 545. 
41 See Declaration of Algeria, supra note 40, at 2, 8 (noting that the declaration 
in question “[seeks] a mutually acceptable resolution of the crisis in their relations 
arising out of the detention of the 52 United States nationals in Iran” and that “[i]f 
any other dispute arises between the parties as to the interpretation [of the 
provisions]” the parties agree to be bound by a tribunal and the Claims Settlement 
Agreement).  
42 See Insurance Claims Resolution Process, HOLOCAUST VICTIM ASSETS 
LITIGATION (SWISS BANKS), http://www.swissbankclaims.com/InsuranceClaims. 
aspx (last updated May 17, 2012) (specifying that “[t]he insurance claims 
resolution process derives from three important documents: (1) the Settlement 
Agreement in the Holocaust Victim Assets class action litigation in the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Chief Judge Edward R. 
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settle claims by members of five represented classes.43  The CRP 
was instituted as part of that Settlement Agreement and was active 
until December 2012.44  
4. The International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC 
Funds) include three intergovernmental organizations 45  that 
provide compensation for damage resulting from oil spills from 
tankers. 46   Under the regime, tanker owners are liable to pay 
compensation, up to a certain limit, for damages following an 
escape of persistent oil from their ships.47  If that amount does not 
cover all the admissible claims, further compensation is available 
from the Fund if the damage occurs in a sovereign state that holds 
a membership to that Fund.48  Additional compensation may also 
be available from a Supplementary Fund if the state is a member of 
that Fund as well.49  The three Funds are not normally paid by 
                                                                                                                        
Korman presiding (the ‘Court’); (2) the Final Order and Judgment of the Court 
approving the Settlement Agreement of July 26, 2000 (as corrected on August 2, 
2000); and (3) the Plan of Allocation and Distribution proposed by Special Master 
Judah Gribetz, approved by Judge Korman on November 22, 2000”). 
43 See Overview, HOLOCAUST VICTIM ASSETS LITIGATION (SWISS BANKS), http:// 
www.swissbankclaims.com/Overview.aspx.  See also Roger P. Alford, The Claims 
Resolution Tribunal, in THE RULES, PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra  note 13, at 
365. 
44 See, e.g., Helena Bachmann, A New Lease on Life for the Mysterious Lost Bank 
Accounts of Switzerland, TIME, Mar. 21, 2013, http://world.time.com/2013/03/21/ 
a-new-lease-on-life-for-the-mysterious-lost-bank-accounts-of-switzerland. 
45 The three funds are the 1971 Fund, the 1992 Fund, and the Supplementary 
Fund. 
46 The Funds: Structure, INTERNATIONAL OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS, 
http://www.iopcfunds.org/about-us/structure/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2013). 
47 International Maritime Organization Protocol of 1992 to Amend the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 29 
November 1969, art. 4 (Nov. 27, 1992) (“[T]he owner of a ship at the time of an 
incident . . . shall be liable for any pollution damage caused by the ship as a result 
of the incident.”).   
48 Id. at art. 8 (“Where an incident has caused pollution damage in the 
territory, including the territorial sea or an area referred to in Article II, of one or 
more Contracting States or preventive measures have been taken to prevent or 
minimize pollution damage in such territory including the territorial sea or area, 
actions for compensation may only be brought in the Courts of any such 
Contracting State or States.”) 
49 Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, art. 4, May 16, 
2003 (“The Supplementary Fund shall pay compensation to any person suffering 
pollution damage if such person has been unable to obtain full and adequate 
compensation for an established claim for such damage under the terms of the 
1992 Fund Convention, because the total damage exceeds, or there is a risk that it 
will exceed, the applicable limit of compensation . . . .”). 
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states; instead, they are financed by levies on certain types of oil 
that are carried by sea, and they are paid by the entities receiving 
the oil after sea transport.50 
Each of these dispute resolution mechanisms can provide some 
interesting elements for the development of a specific system to 
hear mass claims.  The UNCC and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal 
both developed specific procedures to hear mass claims, though 
they only hear cases against a State.  The CRP and IOPC are 
privately funded initiatives that rely on the will of the parties and 
provide compensation for specific, well-determined cases.  They 
also provide interesting examples of possible blueprints for mass 
claims or environmental damage compensation based on a private 
agreement. 
6. CONCLUSION 
When they sought to internationalize their disputes, Chevron 
and the Lago Agrio plaintiffs relied on two different and imperfect 
dispute resolution methods.  Chevron initiated international 
investment arbitration proceedings under a bilateral investment 
agreement.  The Lago Agrio plaintiffs requested preliminary 
measures to block the interim award from the Inter-American 
Human Rights Commission.  Neither of the chosen forums 
provides a full remedy for mass tort violations; however, each has 
certain advantages.  International dispute resolution is certainly 
moving toward a wider acceptance of individual claims; the ICISD 
Abaclat v. Argentina jurisdictional decision illustrates well the 
potential for future developments.  
 This paper also briefly considered additional forums that could 
provide examples of alternative mechanisms to resolve mass tort 
claims.  
 One of the important lessons to be learnt from the Lago Agrio, 
Aguinda, and Chevron litigation is the need for an international 
forum that can provide individual remedies in complex litigation.  
International law needs to catch up with mass tort violations, and 
ensure that international mass tort claimants can be given 
acceptable redress.  
                                                     
50  As of November 1, 2012, there were 108 States that were party to the 1992 
Fund Convention and the 1992 Civil Liability Convention.  Three additional states 
will join by June 27, 2013, bringing the total to 112 states.  See IOPC Secretariat, 
Status of the 1992 Fund Convention and The Supplementary Fund Protocol, IOPC Doc. 
OCT12/8/1 (Aug. 31, 2012), available at http://documentservices.iopcfunds. 
org/meeting-documents/download/docs/3644/lang/en/. 
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